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THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON MANAGEMENT PRACTICES  
IN NEW ZEALAND – A STUDY OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have long believed that competition improves corporate and economic performance 
(Vickers, 1994; Caves, 1980). A competitive environment is healthy for economic progress as it 
drives managerial effort and firm performance (Vickers, 1994) by reducing slack, exerting a 
downward pressure on costs and generating efficiency in production and resource allocation 
(Nickell, 1996). It has also been argued that competition may boost innovation (Porter, 1990; 
Nickell, 1996), including technological innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994), 
process innovation (Pisano, 1996), service innovation (Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997; Agarwal and 
Selen 2009, 2011, 2013; Suarez and Cusumano, 2009; Lusch and Nambisan, 2015), strategic 
innovation (Hamel, 1998; Markides, 1997), and managerial innovation (Birkenshaw, Hamel and 
Mol, 2008; Mol and Birkinshaw, 2009; Birkinshaw and Ansari, 2015; Schoemaker, Heaton and 
Teece 2018). According to Demsetz (1973), competitive rivalry promotes entrepreneurial efforts 
in firms with a focus on achieving (short-term) monopoly power, which may be associated with 
increased concentration within the industry. This in turn can lead to better management practice.  
As such, the objective of this paper is to examine the association between the level of 
competitiveness and management practices across firms in the New Zealand manufacturing sector. 
It has unique geographical features, strong institutions and economic policies approaching what is 
considered best practice, particularly in the areas considered to be beneficial to competition 
(McCann 2009; MBIE, 2016).  New Zealand is a relatively small economy, physically distant from 
                                                          




its neighbours and trading partners, but it is also an open economy. It has largely removed tariffs 
and other protective mechanisms, it has established free trade agreements with many key trading 
partners, and it has very high levels of migration relative to other countries.  In macroeconomic 
terms, it has a policy of openness to external capital, its monetary policy focused on domestic price 
stability, and has had a free-floating exchange rate (Treasury, 2014). 
New Zealand has a firm size structure with a large number of small firms and very few large firms, 
where management capability is generally found to be higher (Stevens, 2012).  The largest firms 
include a large dairy cooperative, and a number that are parts of foreign multinationals, as in 
banking, but it does have relatively high levels of firm and job entry and exit (MBIE 2016). 
Nevertheless, New Zealand has a low level of labour productivity, about 80% of the OECD 
average (MED et al., 2011), which has led to the idea of the ‘New Zealand Paradox’ (McCann 
2009). “The mystery is why a country that seems close to best practice in most of the policies that 
are regarded as the key drivers of growth is nevertheless just an average performer” (OECD, 2003, 
p. 29). 
Given this backdrop, an understanding of how the intensity of competition affects the quality of 
management practices is both interesting and important from a policy perspective.  A few recent 
studies on management practices of the US manufacturing sector found that competition has some 
association with the quality of management practices  (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 
Propper et al. 2015; Bloom, Brynjolfsson et al 2018), while other studies (see Agarwal et al 2013 
for New Zealand; Agarwal et al. 2014 for Australia) have found no real association between the 
two. In part, the conclusions for these two latter studies can be explained by their use of simple 
measures of competition that is, using only the number of competitors as a measure of competition. 




there are various approaches in the literature on how to best characterise and measure the level and 
intensity of competition, there is lack of clarity on the process by which competitive forces 
influence the quality of managerial practices. In this paper, we explore this relationship between 
competition and management practices by adopting a more appropriate measure of competition. 
The measure of competition developed by Boone (2008a) represents one such measure. Boone 
(2008a) derives a theoretically more robust measure of competition where intensity of competition 
is motivated by either more aggressive interaction between firms and / or through reductions in 
the barriers to entry. Other available measures of competition are either too simplistic (for example, 
using the number of competitors in the market) or fail to account for the intensity of competition 
(for example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman and the Lerner Index). We would expect to find that 
measures which fail to account for the intensity of competition don’t fully capture the reality of 
competition in the market and therefore represent a poor indicator for understanding how 
competition impact on the quality of management practices. Our findings suggest that it is the type 
of competition, not just competition per se, that influences management practices. Our findings 
will be of significance to researchers who are interested in studying the role of competition in 
driving individual and firm behaviour in markets, and policy makers who are designing policy 
initiatives to increase the management capability and productivity of firms.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the 
literature on competition and its effect on management practices. In Section 3 we discuss the 
research methodology used in this study and in Section 4 we analyse the results and discuss the 
findings from several multivariate tests using Boone’s (2008a) measure of competition applied to 
New Zealand manufacturing firms. In Section 5 we conclude by providing a number of potential 






COMPETITION AND ITS EFFECT ON MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
To conduct a robust study on the association between competition and management practices, it is 
important to define what is meant by competition and understand its association with managerial 
effort and practices, and its relationship to technical efficiency, production and innovation.   
Salop (1977) defines high product market competition as a reduction in unit transport cost while 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) viewed it as an increase in the substitutability between differentiated 
products. Later, Nickell (1996) argued that the presence of an increased number of competitors (or 
fewer monopoly rents), and the consequential decrease in monopoly power within an industry, as 
an indicator of higher intensity of competition. Measures of the number of competitors and average 
rents (profits less capital costs) normalised on value-added2, are often used to denote the degree of 
competition. Nickell (1996), proposed a measure of the firm’s ability to raise prices above 
marginal cost as an indicator of a firms’ market power while Aghion et al. (2005) proposed a 
representation of competition intensity using the Price-Cost Margin (PCM) or Lerner Index 
method. In principle, as competition increases, the ability for all firms to raise prices over marginal 
cost decreases. Aghion et al. (2001) also proposed a substitutability parameter as the measure of 
competition intensity within each industry, which was denoted by a monotonically increasing 
transformation of the elasticity of substitution in demand between two rivals’ outputs and a 
                                                          
2 Nickell (1996) defines rents as profits before tax + depreciation + interest payments – cost of capital X capital stock. The capital stock is the 
replacement cost capital stock at current prices. The cost of capital is equal to rr + δ + λρ where rr is the real interest rate, δ is the rate of 




monotonically decreasing function of the measure of market power, i.e., the share of profits in 
value added.  
While the literature provides a number of alternative measures of competition, it is relatively scant 
on describing the relationship between competition and management practices with the exception 
of a few pioneering papers (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; 
Bloom, Eifert, et al, 2013; Bloom, Propper et al. 2015; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2016; 
Bloom Brynjolfsson et al 2018). A possible reason for this is that competition has different 
conceptions, many manifestations and several indicators or measures. The few studies on the 
association between competition and management practices (including innovation) are generally 
supported by a diverse variety of arguments. Agency models comprise the main arguments in 
favour of a positive association between competition and management performance and innovation 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). The central theme of this argument 
is that a competitive market drives managerial effort, efficiency, productivity and innovation both 
at the firm level and the industry level, thereby leading to selection of ‘better’ management 
practices. However, the literature also propositions an alternative view as to why competition may 
have a negative influence on managerial effort, efficiency, productivity and innovation (Martin, 
1993; Horn et al., 1994). The argument is that competition tends to induce managerial effort within 
a firm only when the impact it has on increasing the elasticity of demand exceeds the impact it has 
on reducing demand (Willig, 1987; Hermalin, 1992). However, there is no clear consensus in 
literature on how competition impacts the demand for better managerial practices. This is reflected 
in the findings in Agarwal et al. (2013; 2014) who find, contrary to other studies (e.g. Bloom and 





In the following sections we draw out the links between management quality and competition by 
linking management quality to the links between competition and managerial effort technical 
efficiency, productivity and innovation.  
Competition, managerial effort, and management quality 
The profit motive may act as a strong incentive for firms to increase their managerial effort in a 
competitive market. Arguably, greater managerial effort would result in additional and / or better 
management practices with a view to increasing profit in the face of competition. Nickell (1996) 
presents empirical evidence to support that competition tends to cause monopoly rents to dwindle, 
and as a result firms respond by increasing managerial effort and reduce managerial slack, thereby 
positively influencing productivity performance. Another argument for competition driving 
managerial effort is that product market competition makes firm profits more responsive to 
managerial action (see Nickell, 1996), and this provides an incentive for firms to increase 
managerial effort. The fear of bankruptcy associated with increasing competitive pressure may 
also act as a strong incentive for increasing managerial effort and lessening managerial slack (Hart, 
1983). Theory suggests two other ways in which increased competition in the industry helps boost 
managerial effort and company performance. The first is by motivating managerial incentive 
schemes (Holmstrom, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Hart, 1983; Mookherjee, 1984); and the 
second, by influencing the rewards on managerial effort based on the market’s estimate of the 
manager’s ability (Holstrom, 1982; Meyer and Vickers, 1995). However, there is lack of robust 
empirical studies to support these analytical theories and to inform what kind of rewards and 





Competition, technical efficiency, productivity, and management quality 
Empirical studies have also shown that competition tends to increase technical efficiency (see 
Caves and Barton, 1991; Green and Mayes, 1991; Caves, 1992), as it leads to more efficient 
managerial systems and structures within companies (Caves, 1980). At an industry level, 
competition can induce a “Darwinian selection process” whereby greater product market 
competition drives inefficient firms out of the market and more efficient firms to enter (Jovanovic, 
1982; Nickell, 1996; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). Those firms that survive and eventually 
prosper tend to exhibit homogenously more efficient management practices. However, there are 
also reasons why competition may lead to technical inefficiency. In industries with high intensity 
of competition, more efforts may be allocated to limit competitive rivalry through a process of 
reducing the amount of resources for internal capability and capacity improvements, thereby 
directly resulting in production inefficiency (Nickell, 1996). Also, competitive environments are 
associated with higher market uncertainty and unstable cash flows for incumbent firms, leaving 
less resource for investment to raise the level of production efficiency (Schumpeter, 1943). Again, 
there is a mixed view in literature as to what influence competition has on technical efficiency.  
More broadly however, there is evidence to suggest that an increase in market concentration or a 
decrease in competition is associated with an increase in total factor productivity (Haskell, 1991; 
Nickel et al, 1992; Hay and Liu, 1997). Nickell (1996) present empirical evidence to show that 
competition is also associated with a higher rate of productivity growth. However, the extent to 
which differences in management quality or innovation are driving this result remains unclear 
While limitations in the archival data set utilised in this study prevent the testing of this set of 




between competition and management practices, due to many management practices being key 
mechanisms utilised by managers to achieve technical efficiency and productivity growth.  
Competition, innovation, and management quality 
Competition may act as an incentive for firms to improve innovation. Arguably, firms come up 
with innovative products and services and/or improvements in organizational and managerial 
processes to create a sustainable competitive advantage in the market. Existing theories of 
competition and innovation suggest that a competitive environment encourages both diffusion of 
knowledge and the adaptation and imitation of the learning process amongst competing firms in a 
way that positively affects the level of innovation (Wiel & Creusen, 2008; Polder et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, models of product differentiation and monopolistic competition posit that 
product market competition tends to decrease rents after entry, and consequently reduces the 
number of entrants (Salop, 1977; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Models of endogenous growth also 
propose that in high product market competition, firms have an expectation of reduced monopoly 
rents, negatively influences their decisions to invest in innovation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1993).  
Schumpeterian competition and the concept of creative destruction is an alternative, dynamic 
model of competition and innovation. The process of creative destruction is based on fundamental 
breakthroughs that “incessantly revolutionises the economic structure within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter, 1942). This occurrence is 
reliant on the level of research and development (R&D), which in turn is motivated by the 
monopoly rents that acts as a reward to the successful innovator (Schumpeter, 1942 cited in Aghion 




Schumpeter (1943) conjectured a negative relationship between competition and innovation. 
Moreover, creative destruction leads to monopoly rents earned through one innovation being 
destroyed by the next innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1990). An incumbent monopolist has less 
of an incentive to perform R&D and innovate in these analytical models, since it is already 
enjoying monopoly rents (Aghion and Howitt, 1990). When markets operate in this way, imitation 
and weaker patent protection reduces the longevity of rents, further diminishing the incentives for 
investment in R&D and innovation (Zeng, 2001, Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998). 
The above discussion suggests a variety of ways in which competition may influence demand for 
improving better management practices, associated managerial effort, technical efficiency and 
innovation. While there are multiple explanations, the extent to which variation in competition 
may influence the management quality in organisation is open to empirical investigation. 
 
MEASUREMENT APPROACHES AND DATA 
To empirically investigate the association between competition and management practices, we use 
an archival data set on management practices of New Zealand manufacturing firms from Agarwal 
et al. (2013), which we combine with alternative measures for the level of competition in the 
industry. The sample consists of 152 manufacturing firms for which data on management practices 
was collected using an interview methodology (referred to in the literature as double-blind, double-
scoring methodology) as part of the New Zealand Management Practices and Productivity global 
benchmarking project (see Green et al., 2010).  
Table 1 lists the number of firms within each of the industry sub-sector groupings in accordance 




<Insert Table 1 here> 
Measuring Management Practices 
The research project titled ‘Management Matters – How Does Manufacturing Measure Up?’ was 
commissioned by New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and implemented as 
part of a world-wide study led by the London School of Economics (LSE), Stanford University, 
and McKinsey and Co, the World Management Survey. The project applied a methodology 
originally developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) to measure the quality of management 
practices in New Zealand manufacturing firms, which comprised 18 management practice 
dimensions. Details of the 18 individual management practices dimensions measured are given in 
Table II. Each of the 18 dimensions were drawn from prior literature which suggested that the 
dimension comprised a range of practices which could be classified as generally better vs worse 
for manufacturing industry firms. We utilized this archival dataset of 152 medium- and large-
sized3 manufacturing firms. The interview method used in data collection was a structured 
conversation-based interview scoring grid, which defines and describes the scoring criteria from 
one (worst practice) to five (best practice) across eighteen management practices dimensions 
comprising three broad management areas: operations (consisting of seven practices), performance 
(consisting of five practices) and people management (consisting of six practices). The technique 
of ‘double blind, double scoring’ was adopted to minimise bias and measurement error (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2007; 2010).4 In order to collect accurate responses and for benchmarking 
                                                          
3 As small size firms in New Zealand were not in scope of the research project, only firms with > 50 employees were included in the study. 
4 The ‘double blind’ nature of the interviews meant that the interviewed managers were unaware that their responses were being scored, and 
the interviewers were also not privy to any background information on the interviewed firm, so as to eliminate any response or scoring bias. 
Approximately 80 per cent of all interviews were ‘double scored’, in that while they were run and scored by a main interviewer, and were also 
silently listened to and independently scored by another team member. As per privacy regulation, interviewees in New Zealand were informed 




purposes at a global level, the interviewers were given specialised training to ensure consistency 
in standards and to make the results comparable with those of other similar global studies.  
<Insert Table II here> 
To maintain a consistent approach with that of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) the overall 
management score of each firm was treated as unidimensional5 and constructed by averaging the 
management practice scores across each of the 18 management areas. This score was transformed 
into a z-score by normalizing individual practice to mean zero and standard deviation one.  
Measuring Competition  
The research project titled ‘Competition and Management Practices in New Zealand 
Manufacturing Enterprises’ was commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Development 
(MED).  This research project investigated the nature of competition in various industries in the 
New Zealand economy and its influence on firm outcomes was matched to determine whether 
competition indeed create a spur to better management practices. The competition data was 
collected as part of 2-year research project conducted by the Treasury, the Commerce Commission 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade which investigated the nature of competition in 
various industries of the NZ economy and its influence on firm outcomes (R&D, innovation and 
productivity). 
As we have noted earlier, there is little consensus regarding the best measure by which to gauge 
competition. The choice of method used requires an understanding of the context within which the 
measure of competition will be applied. With this in mind, our starting point is to consider the 
                                                          
5 Consistent with the view that the measure is unidimensional, there is high correlation between the 18 management practices, with one factor 




most commonly used measures of competition and to determine which of these is most suited to 
understanding how competition impact on management practices. The most four common of the 
measures for competition are6: 
1. Profit Elasticity (PE) 
2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
3. Price Cost Margin or Lerner Index (PCM) 
4. Number of competitors, self-reported by interviewed firms 
 
In Appendix A we provide further detailed descriptions of the HHI and Lerner measures of 
competition.  In Appendix B we provide a summary of literature on competition and management 
practices, identifying both the measures of competition used and their association with 
management practices. Further discussion of these measures of competition and their relevance in 
gauging the effects of competition on management practice is provided below. 
The first three measure of competition were constructed by MED at the 4-digit ANZSIC level at 
the industry level. The data for number of competitors was collected through the Management 
Matters – How Does Manufacturing Measure Up? management practices project for which 
interviews were conducted with the 152 manufacturing firms, and each interviewed firm was asked 
to self-report on the number of competitors7. The construct of the number of competitors used is 
identical to that constructed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010). A limitation of this proxy 
                                                          
6 Devine et al. (2011) provides a fuller discussion of these four measures and their limitations 
7 The competition data obtained from this project defined the number of actual competitors ie. valued at the actual figure reported by the 
interviewed firm in case the number of competitors claimed was less than ten; and capped at an upper limit of ten if the claimed figure 




measure as interviewees’ perceptions of the degree of competition intensity they face may not be 
completely accurate. 
In Table III we provide a summary description of these four competition measures, their relevance 
to competitive pressures influencing management practices and the association competition is 
hypothesised to have with the measure of management practices. Of these 4 measures of 
competition, the profit elasticity measure of competition (Boone, 2008a) is the most relevant of 
the measures of competition for the purposes of studying the relationship between management 
practices (of New Zealand manufacturing firms) and competition. Specifically, the profit elasticity 
measure captures the effects of external influences on firm profitability that requires a reaction by 
management through some change to its management practices.  Whilst we focus on the profit 
elasticity measure of competition to better understand the effects of competition on management 
practices, we provide estimates using three measures to evaluate our hypothesis: competition 
intensity has a positive and significant effect on the quality of management practices adopted by 
firms. The details of respective hypothesis as per different measures of competition are given in 
column 5 of Table III. We expect to find mixed results using the three measures of competition for 
reasons discussed below.  
<Insert Table III here> 
There is a consensus in the economics literature that the HHI index developed by Hirschman 
(1964) is an inefficient indicator of intense competition (Leon, 2015; Devine et al, 2011). The 
reasons range from being unable to account for intensity of competition in product markets, the 
importance of larger firms being assigned a greater weight than smaller firms, and the sensitivity 
of the measure to the number of competitive firms present in the market. Perhaps the biggest 




is its inability to measure the intensity competition originating from overseas. For this reason, the 
PCM measure (Aghion et al. 2005) is often preferred as a measure of competition over HHI; it is 
not as susceptible to the same range of weaknesses typical of the HHI index. However, the PCM 
measure is susceptible to other problems that have been demonstrated by Boone (2008a, 2008b) 
to include inaccurately gauging the intensity of competition in concentrated (oligopoly) markets. 
In addition to this, Boone, van Ours and van der Wiel (2013) also find that PCM inaccurately 
measures competition when declines reductions in entry barriers lead to more firms in the market 
and the intensity in competition of the incumbent firms increases quickly. Boone (2004) also 
identifies inadequacies in the PCM as a measure of competition when it is used to examine the 
relationship between productivity and competition, something that is important in our framework 
as we are focused on the relationship between competition and management practices that directly 
impacts on the level of productivity.  
Perhaps the simplest measure of competition is the count of the number of competitors. Whilst this 
has the advantage of simplicity, it is unable to account for the way the intensity of competition 
may vary from one market to another due to the differences in production technology, the nature 
of demand and the impact of imports on the domestic market.   
The remaining measure of competition in our suite of competitiveness measures is the Profit 
Elasticity measure proposed by Boone (2008a). This measure of elasticity overcomes many of the 
concerns afflicting the other measures of competition. Boone’s (2008b) measure of competition 
using Profit-Elasticity (PE) examines how a change in marginal cost causes a change in profits of 
firms in an industry, expressed as a negative number.  The more (less) negative the PE coefficient, 
the greater (less) the decrease in profit relative to the increase in marginal cost, and so the higher 




will increase the relative profit difference between more and less efficient firms, as more efficient 
firms are better able to exploit their advantage over inefficient firms in a competitive market. 
Griffith et al. (2005) extend this concept to a more general, industry-wide measure of competition. 
The PE measure is calculated by estimating an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of firms’ 
profits on their average variable costs. The specification for this regression model is as follows: 















 lnln:           (1) 
where profit equals gross output of firm i (yi) less total variable cost (tvci) (labour costs and 
intermediate consumption), and average variable costs are equal to total variable cost (tvci) divided 
by gross output (yi). The β coefficient (sometime known as the Boone Indicator) estimates the 
elasticity of profits to changes in cost. β is expected to be negative, indicating that as average costs 
increase, profits of the firm will decrease. In a more competitive market, β will be more negative, 
indicating that firms’ profits are more sensitive to similar changes in their average costs.  
The PE measure assumes that all firms are otherwise completely symmetric except for their 
marginal cost and that all firms choose their strategic variables simultaneously and independently. 
Under these assumptions, it is monotonic with competition.  As competition intensity increases, 
the negative relationship between average cost and profit becomes stronger. Therefore, PE, unlike 
the other measures used here, is robust to the ambiguity of the reallocation and selection effects.   
When firm productivity varies across industries, increasing competition can increase market 
concentration. Consider an industry where there is a distribution of firms with different price mark-
ups, due to differences in efficiency. More efficient firms have higher profits and profit margins, 




simplicity, that increased competition affects all firms’ prices in a similar way (i.e. that all firms 
must lower their prices to compete and it does not change the rankings of prices). This will lead to 
the mark-ups of all firms to fall. Beyond the impact on each individual firm’s mark-up, an increase 
in competition is likely to have two broader effects - a reallocation effect and a selection effect 
(Devine et al., 2011) as explained below:   
 The reallocation effect relates to the fact that inefficiency is punished in more competitive 
markets. When competition increases, profits will be reallocated from less efficient firms 
to more efficient firms, as the former have less ability to reduce margins while remaining 
profitable. 
 The selection effect operates through firm exit, as the least efficient firms become 
unprofitable and are forced to exit the market. The remaining firms – those with higher 
mark-up – will increase their output to compensate for the exit of less efficient firms, ceteris 
paribus.   
The net effect of these factors has implications for measuring competition. If firms in a market are 
not homogenous in terms of their productivity (as a wealth of evidence suggests is the case, e.g. 
Syversen, 2011), these mechanisms will have an ambiguous effect on many methods for measuring 
competition. A broad definition of efficiency covers the spectrum of phenomena from the 
effectiveness with which a firm employs its inputs (including its management practices and 
technology), to its ability to charge a premium price through strategies like product differentiation 
(through advertising and creating ‘niche’ markets). The greater the distribution of efficiency across 
firms in a market, the greater the potential ambiguous measures of competition. For this reason, 
the PE measure proposed by Boone (2008b) provides the best of these measures for gauging the 





Descriptive statistics   
Table IV Panel A provides the descriptive statistics on all relevant variables from the sample of 
152 NZ firms used in this analysis, and Table IV Panel B reports on the correlation matrix.  This 
data reveals that there is variation in the sample statistics. The average management practices score 
is 2.85 and the average firm has 290 employees and a reported an average of 6.83 competitors. 
Two firms did not provide information on the number of competitors, and the level of education 
of management and employees.  
<Insert Table IV Panel A here> 
<Insert Table IV Panel B here> 
 
RESEARCH METHOD   
The level of competition has long been argued to drive social well-being and economic growth.  
At the firm level, the intensity of competition amongst firms has been posited to drive better 
performance amongst managers (see Nickell, 1996). The argument is that competition provides 
opportunities to improve firm performance and in return incentives are offered to managers to 
generate better returns and increase market share. Consequently, if managers are to achieve this 
dual objective of improving firm performance in order to meet their incentive targets, managers 
need to improve their managerial capabilities. Therefore, the greater the level and intensity of 
competition, the greater the impact competition is likely to have on managerial capabilities.  
Following Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) we assess the association between competition and 
management practice using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), after controlling for many potential 




measure of competition as discussed above. The general controls we include are industry dummies, 
region dummies, firm size, age of the firm, the share of the workforce with higher degree 
qualifications, average hours worked, union membership, whether a firm is listed as a public 
company, and other controls including interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure, the day 
of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted, and the 
duration of the interviews. As industries may have systematically different management practices, 
there is the possibility that the results may be affected as a result of co-linearity. Therefore, we 
estimate the model with and without industry controls. We also estimate the model without 
controls to provide an indication of the explanatory power of the variables of interest. 
The model takes the following general specification:  
       𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 1 + 2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                            (2) 
where: 
MPS = Average of 18 Management Practices standardised to a z-score. 
Competition = Profit Elasticity (as defined by Boone, 2008b) 
Controls = General controls and noise controls specified above. 
 
To evaluate whether there is a positive association between management practices and 
competition, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: There is a positive association between better management practices and 






ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Figure I provides a margin plot of Boone’s (2008a) estimate of competitiveness (PE) on MPS, 
which shows a negative association. The results of the multivariate tests using Boone’s (2008a) 
estimate of competitiveness across NZ manufacturing firms is reported in Table V. The coefficient 
estimates and the corresponding p-values (in parenthesis) from estimating Equation 2 are reported 
for Boone’s (2008b) profit elasticity (PE) measure. In column 1, the estimated PE coefficient is 
negative (as expected) and significant at the 5% level suggesting that the more (less) negative the 
PE coefficient, the greater (less) the decrease in profit relative to increasing marginal cost and the 
higher (lower) the level of competition. In column 2 of Table V we re-estimate the model using 
standard errors clustered by industry grouping to find the results are largely unaffected. In each 
case, the coefficient estimates on Boone’s measure of competition (PE) were found to be 
negatively associated with management practices and significant at the (5% level) with an adjusted 
R-squared of 0.37. The results imply that increases in the level of competition leads to better 
management practices. According to Boone (2008b), PE is a measure of the sensitivity of profits 
to firms’ efficiency within an industry, and accordingly the findings suggest that firms in industries 
with greater profit elasticity (more competitive) have better management practices. Our results 
confirm this finding. This implies that, at the firm level, better management practice tends to be 
associated with: (i) a presence in markets where firms could gain higher margins and (ii) a presence 
in markets in which firms’ profits were more sensitive to firms’ efficiency. 
 





<Insert Table V here> 
Robustness testing 
In order to test the robustness of the results, the model is re-estimated with the most influential 
firms removed and using a number of different specifications. t Various methods to detect outlier 
were used to ensure that the estimates were not unduly affected. It is important to note that data on 
management practices have been collected directly from the firms, while competition measures 
has been calculated over a large number of observations at the industry level. This indicates the 
common rationale for excluding outliers (e.g. data errors, unusual firm observations, unusually 
high or low values). We specifically use Hadi’s method (1992, 1994) and Cook’s Distance to 
identify which firms have the greatest influence on the results. Observations which influenced 
more than one model were identified and excluded from the results. These methods identified 7 
observations to be excluded from the available sample. The results are reported in Columns 3 of 
the Table V. The estimated PE coefficient remains within the same order of magnitude as the 
coefficient reported in column 1 and significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests that the 
estimates are not sensitive to the outliers removed from the overall sample set.  
To evaluate further the sensitivity of the results, the model was again re-estimated without industry 
and regional effects controls (and excluding outliers). The motivation for doing so is that industry 
and regions may have a ‘fixed’ effect, where industry participants or firms operating in closer 
proximity have similar management practices. This is consistent with Green et al. (2010) and 
Agarwal et al (2013) who found that some NZ manufacturing industries (and regions) have better 
management practices than others. As different industries also have different level of competition, 




results due to co-linearity. Accordingly, we estimate the model with industry and region controls 
excluded, as presented in Column 4 of Table V. The adjusted R-squared values increased from 
37.1% to 41.0%, which is somewhat higher when compared to the situation of including industry 
and region controls. As shown in the Table V, the associations between competition measures and 
PE were also of similar size and direction and significant at the 5% level.   
Another avenue which we explored is the possibility that competition has non-linear effects on 
managerial practices. For example, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) find an 
inverted U shape association between a measure of competition and a proxy for innovation. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to explore the theoretical reasons why a non-linear association may 
or may not exist between the adoption of ‘better’ management practices and competition. 
However, we do empirically test for a non-linear association but we do not find any evidence that 
such a non-linear association exists. 
 
Other Measures of Competition 
The focus of our analysis has been on the use of Boone’s (2008b) profit elasticity measure to gauge 
the impact competition has on management practices. In this section we estimate equation (2) 
using the other three measures of competition (PCM, HHI and Number of Competitors) given in 
Table III, noting the expected sign and likely significance of the relationship that was 
hypothesised. In Table VI, we report the results for each of the three measures of competition.  
 





We find, as suggested in Table III, that the results are inconclusive with respect to the impact 
competition has on management practices. As argued earlier, this finding is not surprising given 
the inadequacies of each of these three measures of competition. In particular, we find that using 
these three measures a firm facing substantial competition is unlikely to see any significant effects 
on its management practices – a result that is contrary to the findings when using the profit 
elasticity measure of competition. However, for reasons given in column 3 in Table III, these 
measures of competition have little compatibility with the definition and measure of management 
practices. The coefficients have the wrong signs and they are all insignificant at the 5% 
significance level.  These findings are consistent with the earlier justifications that these alternate 
measures of competition are inappropriate for the purposes of evaluating the effects of competition 
on management practices. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper has been to investigate whether there is an association between 
competition and management practices across New Zealand manufacturing firms using Boone 
(2008b) profit elasticity measure. We find a statistically significant, negative association between 
PE and management practices which implies that, at the firm level, better management practices 
tended to be associated with (i) firms earning higher margins and (ii) firms’ profits being more 
sensitive to firms’ level of efficiency. The findings point to some evidence of an association 
between the level of competition within an industry and overall management practices and 




There are number of potential explanations for this result. The finding of a positive association 
between the level of competition and management practices is consistent with other studies (Bloom 
and Van reenen, 2007; Bloom Sadun and Van Reenen, 2016) that have found an association 
between better management practices and firm performance. The findings also extend the work of 
Agarwal, et al. (2013) that used only a simplistic measure of competition, namely the number of 
competitors (with a maximum of 10) identified by those being interviewed on their organisation’s 
management practices. Such a measure does not capture the extent nor the magnitude of 
competition facing each firm. Notably, we also find no association between better management 
practices and competition when it is measured using similarly deficient representations of 
competition including the overall number of competitors, industry concentration (HHI) and price 
cost margin. The weaknesses of these alternative measures of competition have already been 
described and explain why their association with management practices leads to (at times) a 
theoretically inconsistent result. We argue in this paper that the use of the Boone indicator provides 
a more theoretically consistent measure of competition which we find has a positive and significant 
association with management practices in the manufacturing sector in New Zealand.  Our findings 
are consistent with the idea that it is competition intensity, rather than the level of competition (e.g. 
the number of competing firms), that explains changes in the quality of firm level management 
practices.   
Further, this result is consistent with the argument that the profit elasticity measure better gauges 
the competitive intensity in a market than measures such as mark-ups and numbers of firms, which 
are both the outcomes of competitive process, and also of other factors that may vary across 
markets – e.g. size of the market in terms of consumers or openness to trade.  Indeed, a better 




strong institutions that is physically distant from the rest of the world.  Some sectors that are 
geographically concentrated in small markets (e.g. services like cafés and restaurants) may have 
small numbers of firms but be highly competitive. Conversely, they might have large numbers of 
firms nationally, but if the appropriate measure of a market is a small locality, this may look like 
a highly competitive market nationally, even if it were made up of a large number of small 
monopolies.  This would not be identified using measures like the HHI or counts of firms but will 
through profit elasticity.  It would be interesting in future work to see whether the technical and 
social changes that have come about due to services such as Uber Eats have an impact on these 
markets.  
That is not to say that competition alone influences the quality of management practices. There are 
also other factors that also affect the quality of management practices – for example, those which 
can be explained by the diffusion of innovation literature (Agarwal et al. 2014). In small, distant 
economy, such as New Zealand, the size of the rents that can be earned by a competitive investment 
in assets such as the management capability of the organisation, will be smaller.  This will attenuate 
the relationship between competition and management practices and, therefore, reduce the 
productivity-enhancing benefits of competition.  This may, in part, explain New Zealand’s 
‘productivity paradox’ (McCann, 2009).   
This finding has policy implications for upholding and promoting competition across industries. 
First, the results suggest that policy makers need to be cognisant that the various measures of 
competition available perform a different function and the use of appropriate measures matters is 
critical when making inferences. In the context of this study, the measure of price elasticity signals 
the degree of substitutability between products (a fundamental basis for competition) that an 




the use of the Boone measure of competition is the most appropriate measure of competition in 
this context. Second, to have the greatest effect on management capability, policy makers may be 
better focusing on the specific type of competition in the market and research is required to tease 
out the specific relationship between such policies and the degree of competition. Third, the 
findings have implications for managerial policy at the firm level. Firms operating in highly 
competitive markets need to invest in better management practices (e.g. better strategic 
management systems) if they are to survive pressure from their competitors over the longer term.  
There are several areas limitations and future research opportunities in this area. The limitations 
include that this study uses cross-sectional data and the use of panel data may provide more 
findings that are reliable. The study is also limited to manufacturing firms (for one economy) and 
it would be interesting to either conduct (i) a similar study for another country; or (ii) an extension 
of the study to other industries. More research is required to better understand the links between 
policy settings, competition dynamics and the effects of competition in the real economy. Our 
work suggests that previously used measure of competition, which have been relied up by policy 
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Table I –Sample of Industry groupings 
Industry group Frequency 
21: Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing 36 
22: Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Leather Manufacturing 13 
23: Wood and Paper Product Manufacturing 20 
24: Printing, Publishing and Recorded Media 3 
25: Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product Manufacturing 22 
26: Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 7 
27: Metal Product Manufacturing 19 
28: Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 27 






Table II – Management Practices Dimensions 
 
Operations Management 
1. Adoption of Lean Manufacturing: Assesses how well lean (modern) manufacturing techniques have been introduced 
Better practice: All major aspects of Lean have been implemented 
Worst practice: Other than just-in-time, no other aspects of Lean have been introduced 
2. Rationale for the adoption: Assesses the motivation and impetus behind changes to operations and what change story was communicated 
Better practice: Lean was introduced to meet business objectives 
Worst practice: Lean was introduced to catch up to competitors 
3. Process problem documentation: Assesses processes for and attitudes to continuous improvement and whether learning’s are captured / documented 
Better practice: Exposing problems is integral to individuals’ responsibilities rather than ad hoc solutions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Worst practice: No process improvements are made when problems occur 
4. Operations Performance tracking: Assesses whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and communicated to staff 
Better practice: Performance is continuously tracked and communicated to all staff using a range of visual tools 
Worst practice: Tracking is ad hoc, and measures being tracked do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met 
5. Operations Performance review: Assesses whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and communicated to staff 
Better practice: Performance is continuously reviewed, based on indicators tracked; follow-up ensures continuous improvement 
Worst practice: Performance is reviewed infrequently and only success or failure is noted 
6. Operations Performance dialogue: Assesses the quality of review conversations 
Better practice: Regular performance conversations focus on addressing root causes. Purpose, agenda, and follow-up steps are clear to all 
Worst practice: Relevant data are often not present at meetings or discussion is based on data that is not meaningful. Agenda and purpose are not clear 
7. Consequence management: Assesses whether differing levels of performance (not personal but plan / process based) lead to different consequences  
Better practice: Failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining or moving individuals around. 
Worst practice: Failure to achieve agreed targets does not carry any consequences 
Performance Management 
8. Types of goals: Assesses whether targets cover a sufficiently broad set of metrics and whether financial and non-financial targets are balanced 
Better practice: Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial goals 
Worst practice: Goals are exclusively financial or operational 
9. Interconnection of goals: Assesses whether targets are tied to the organization’s objectives and how well they cascade down the organisation 
Better practice: Corporate goals increase in specificity as they cascade 
through the business units 




10. Time horizon: Assesses whether the firm has a ‘3 horizons’ approach to planning and targets (short and long term goals and targets) 
Better practice: Short-term goals are set so that they become a staircase to reach the long-term goals 
Worst practice: Top management’s main focus is on short term goals 
11. Setting stretch goals: Assesses whether targets are based on a solid rational and are appropriately difficult to achieve 
Better practice: Goals are demanding for all divisions, and are grounded in solid economic rationale 
Worst practice: Goals are either too easy or impossible to achieve 
12. Clarity of goals: Assesses how easily understandable performance measures are and whether performance is openly communicated to staff 
Better practice: Performance measures are well defined and well communicated; 
worker performance is made public to induce competition 
Worst practice: Performance measures are complex and not clearly 
understood; worker performance is not made public 
People Management 
13. Instilling a talent mindset: Assesses what emphasis is on overall talent management within the organisation 
Better practice: Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
Worst practice: Senior management do not 
communicate that attracting, retaining, and developing talent is a top priority 
14. Rewarding top performance: Assesses whether there is a systematic approach to identifying good and bad performers and rewarding them proportionately 
Better practice: The firm provides ambitious stretch targets with clear 
performance related accountability and rewards 
Worst practice: People within the firm are rewarded equally irrespective of performance level 
15. Addressing poor performance: Assesses how well the organisation is able to deal with underperformers 
Better practice: Poor performers are moved to less critical roles or out of the company as soon as weaknesses are identified 
Worst practice: Poor performers are rarely removed from their positions 
16. Promoting high performers: Assesses whether promotion is performance based and whether talent is developed within the organisation 
Better practice: Top performers are actively identified, developed, and promoted 
Worst practice: People are promoted primarily upon the basis of tenure 
17. Attracting high performers: Assesses the strength of the employee value proposition 
Better practice: The firm provides a unique value proposition to encourage talented people to join the company instead of the competitors 
Worst practice: Competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their companies 
18. Retaining high performers: Assesses whether the organisation will go out of its way to keep its top talent 
Better practice: Managers do whatever it takes to retain top talent 
Worst practice: Managers do little to try and keep the top talent 











Relevance to Management 
Practices 
(3) 





1 Profit Elasticity 
(PE) Boone 
(2008) 
Measure of how a change in 
marginal cost causes a change in 
profits of firms in an industry, 
expressed as a negative number. 
This measure of competition entails 
a specific response by management 
both to its own initiatives to 
improve its financial performance 
but also to respond to competitive 
pressures in the market. As such, 
this measure of competition 
captures the effects of external 
influences on firm profitability that 
requires a reaction by management 
through some change to its 
management practices.    
The more (less) negative the PE 
coefficient, the greater (less) the 
decrease in profit relative to 
increasing marginal cost, the higher 







likely  for 
reasons given 





Estimate of the level of industry 
concentration for all industries in 
the sample. 
Although market concentration may 
influence management practices, 
HHI fails to account for difference 
in geographic locations of 
competitors and also fails to take 
into account the specific market in 
which the competitors are operating 
in. This measure may suggest 
competitive pressures are present 
but to the competitors may in fact 
not be credible (i.e., a likely threat).  
The greater (smaller) the index, the 
more (less) concentrated the industry, 









3 Price Cost Margin 
or Lerner Index 
(PCM) Aghion et 
al. (2005) 
Indicator of the firm’s market 
power, its ability to raise prices 
above marginal cost, aggregated 
by firm’s market share. 
The Lerner index does not take into 
account varying initiatives by firms 
in using resources across different 
innovative activities to improve 
firm performance, as such does not 
capture the effects competitive 
pressures are likely to have on 
management practices. 
The greater (smaller) the price cost 
margin, the more (less) profitable the 
industry, indicating lower (higher) 















4 Number of 
competitors  
Total number of firms in the same 
industry or product/service range  
. 
Although the number of 
competitors influences how 
management may respond to 
competitive threats, this variable 
does not take into account the real 
nature of the competition – whether 
it is a credible threat or not.  
The greater (smaller) the number of 
competitors, the greater (smaller) the 
competition and pressure on 











Table IV Panel A– Descriptive Statistics of sample 
 
Variable n. Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Management Practices Score (MPS) 152 2.83 2.85 0.56 
PE (4 digit ANZSIC) 152 -1.13 -1.31 1.26 
Number of perceived competitors 150 8 6.83 3.34 
Firm Size (number of employees) 152 150 290 482 
Firm age (years) 152 29.50 32.16 22.55 
% of employees with tertiary degree 150 2 7.56  13.5  
Average hours per week worked by employees 152 42 43.72 5.78 





Table IV Panel B – Correlation matrix of sample 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Management Practices Score 
(MPS) (1) 
1 
         
           
PCM (4 digit ANZSIC) (2) 0.121 1 
        
 
(0.138) 
         
PE (4 digit ANZSIC) (3) -0.064 0.29 1 
       
 
(0.433) (0.000) 
        
HHI (4 digit ANZSIC)  (4) 0.012 0.222 0.096 1 
      
 
(0.892) (0.012) (0.287) 
       
ln(Number of perceived 
competitors) (5) 
0.005 -0.053 0.039 -0.113 1 
     
 
(0.951) (0.519) (0.633) (0.212) 
      
Firm Size (number of 
employees) (6) 
0.346 -0.032 -0.083 0.077 0.171 1 
    
 
(0.000) (0.696) (0.311) (0.390) (0.037) 
     
Average hours per week worked 
by employees (7) 
-0.148 0.025 -0.094 0.168 -0.164 0.021 1 
   
 
(0.069) (0.764) (0.253) (0.062) (0.045) (0.797) 
    
% of employees with tertiary 
degree (8) 
0.277 0.025 -0.072 -0.057 0.073 0.116 -0.171 1 
  
 
(0.001) (0.763) (0.384) (0.530) (0.380) (0.158) (0.036) 
   
Ln(Firm age (years)) (9) 0.078 0.004 0.019 0.07 0.094 0.029 -0.106 -0.032 1 
 
 
(0.337) (0.956) (0.818) (0.433) (0.253) (0.727) (0.197) (0.694) 
  
Percentage of employees 
belonging to a union (10) 
0.131 0.103 0.13 -0.039 0.035 0.238 -0.197 -0.027 0.067 1 
 







Table V– Management Practices and Price Elasticity (PE) Competition Measure 















(all controls except 
industry and 
region dummies – 
outliers removed) 
      
PE (4 digit ANZSIC) -0.138 -0.138 -0.158 -0.123 
  (0.047) (0.018) (0.026) (0.003) 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes No 
General controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 150 150 143 143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.47 
Note: All columns estimated by OLS with all controls with the p values in parentheses under coefficient estimates (the p 
values are estimated using robust standard errors). The sample includes all firms with available competition data. “PE” is 
Profit Elasticity which indicates how a change in marginal cost causes a change in profits of firms in an industry, expressed 
as a negative number. “Region dummies” include the 4 Region dummies. “Industry dummies” include a full set of ANZIC 
industry codes. “General controls” comprise of firm-level controls including ln(firm size), ln(firm age), the share of 
workforce with degrees, ln(average hours worked), union membership dummy and dummy variables if the firm is listed. 
“Noise controls” are interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure, the day of the week the interview was conducted, 
the time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews. “MPS” is the firm-level management score, 
standardised to a z-score, where each individual practice is z-scored, then average across all 18 questions, and then this 




Table VI– Evaluating the effects of other three measures of competition on management 
practices (PCM, HHI and Number of Competitors). 
Column (Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 






all controls – with outliers 
removed 
 
all controls except industry 
and region dummies – with 
outliers removed 
 
              













HHI (4 digit 






    (0.149)   (0.168)   (0.303)  
 Number of 









   (0.649)   (0.980)   (0.478) 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
General controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 150 124 148 143 119 141 143 119 141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.355 0.353 0.417 0.385 0.413 0.453 0.438 0.455 
Note: All columns estimated by OLS with all controls with the p values in parentheses under coefficient estimates (the p 
values are estimated using robust standard errors). The sample includes all firms with available competition data. “PE” is 
Profit Elasticity which indicates how a change in marginal cost causes a change in profits of firms in an industry, expressed 
as a negative number. “Region dummies” include the 4 Region dummies. “Industry dummies” include a full set of ANZIC 
industry codes. “General controls” comprise of firm-level controls including ln(firm size), ln(firm age), the share of 
workforce with degrees, ln(average hours worked), union membership dummy and dummy variables if the firm is listed. 
“Noise controls” are interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure, the day of the week the interview was conducted, 
the time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews. “MPS” is the firm-level management score, 
standardised to a z-score, where each individual practice is z-scored, then average across all 18 questions, and then this 
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